The Forgetful Witness
David Greenwaldt
If witnesses always told the truth and never forgot what they
once knew, trials would be simpler affairs. But witnesses do, on
occasion, lie, and they often forget. The technique of impeachment
and the hearsay rule' combat these weaknesses of testimony, the
first permitting exposure of falsehood or faulty memory, the second barring introduction of evidence that may be based on them.
Both reflect the strong reliance the adversary system places upon
cross-examination. 2 Impeachment is generally accomplished
through cross-examination, and the policy of the hearsay rule
would be much less persuasive if cross-examination's ability to distinguish accurate from inaccurate testimony were doubted.' But
while cross-examination may indeed be a powerful device, it presupposes a witness who offers testimony that can be crossed. Perhaps the greatest challenge to the cross-examiner is not the witness
who purports to know what he has never known or has forgotten,
but rather the witness who purports to forget what in fact he
knows.
When a witness says he forgets, prior statements made or
adopted by him when he made no such claim offer a backup. The
examiner may seek to refresh the witness's recollection with such
prior statements, and if the witness finds them useful at jogging his
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I Hearsay, as defined in the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"), is a "statement, other
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FRE 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible.
See FRE 802.
' See John Henry Wigmore, 5 A Treatiseon the Anglo-American System of Evidence §
1367 at 32 (Little, Brown, Chadbourn, rev ed 1974) (cross-examination is a "vital feature" of
the adversary system); Notes of Advisory Committee, Introductory Note: The Hearsay
Problem, FRE, Art VIII ("The belief, or perhaps hope, that cross-examination is effective in
exposing imperfections of perception, memory, and narration is fundamental.").
3 One of the reasons offered for exclusion of hearsay is that the person against whom it
is offered has generally not had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Indeed,
when a statement has been probed at a prior hearing or deposition by the person against
whom it is offered and the declarant is unavailable, the statement sheds its hearsay status.
See FRE 804(b)(1).
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memory, he may use them while testifying. 4 But if the witness asserts, after reviewing them, that his memory remains blank, the
5
statements' status as hearsay complicates their admission.
The statements may, of course, be admissible under one of the
many general hearsay exceptions, codified under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803, including the important exception for recorded
recollections.6 'Moreover, a witness who testifies to a lack of memory becomes technically "unavailable" under Rule 804,7 which expands the set of hearsay exceptions under which a prior statement
will be admissible. The forgetful witness's past testimony becomes
admissible upon an assertion of memory loss if the party against
whom the testimony is now offered had an opportunity and a similar motive to examine the witness when the testimony was originally given. 8 So too, Rule 804 accommodates the party calling a
forgetful witness by permitting introduction of the witness's statements against interest,9 statements under belief of impending
death, 0 and statements of personal or family history.1 1 But courts
will not admit many statements, such as grand jury testimony,
under any of the codified hearsay exceptions, notwithstanding the

' For the foundational requirements for using a written statement to refresh recollection, see Thomas A. Mauet, Fundamentalsof Trial Techniques 111-13 (Little, Brown, 3d ed
1992). See also FRE 612 (permitting use of writing to refresh recollection before or during
testimonial appearance).
' An important qualification is that the witness may not be an opposing party. Statements of opposing parties (and authorized agents, employees, and co-conspirators) are "admissions" excluded from the definition of hearsay and thus are normally admissible. FRE
801(d)(2).
6 FRE 803(5) ("A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness
once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify
fully and accurately, shown to have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter
was fresh in the witness's memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly."). As it developed
at common law, the exception required the record to have been made very soon after perceiving the event in question. See Edward W. Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 301 at
866 (West, 3d ed 1984). But, under Rule 803(5), the period after which memory may still
qualify as "fresh" may extend beyond a few days. See, for example, United States v Patterson, 678 F2d 774, 779 (9th Cir 1982) (memory fresh in witness's mind ten months after
event, although "question admittedly [] a close one"). For purposes of this Comment's discussion, it is assumed that prior statements will have been determined to be inadmissible as
recorded recollections. For a treatment of this important exception, see Jack B. Weinstein
and Margaret A. Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence § 803(5)[01]-[02] at 803-157 to -173 (Matthew Bender, 1987 & Supp 1992).
7 A witness is also "unavailable" within the meaning of FRE 804 if the witness has a
privilege not to testify, refuses to testify, is unable to testify because of illness, or is otherwise excusably absent. FRE 804(a).
8 See FRE 804(b)(1).
9 See FRE 804(b)(3).
10 See FRE 804(b)(2).
See FRE 804(b)(4).
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witness's inability to remember them. This Comment considers
how courts wrestle with these statements from an evidentiary
perspective.12
Courts often overrule a hearsay objection or permit impeachment when convinced a witness is only feigning forgetfulness. If
the prior statements were sworn, courts admit the statements as
substantive evidence under the exception for prior sworn inconsistent statements, 13 despite the fact that present forgetfulness is not
technically inconsistent with the prior statements. After a discussion of whether a criminal defendant can confront a forgetful witness within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, this Comment
examines the elements of this "feigned forgetfulness" exception to
the hearsay rule, and its place under the Federal Rules of Evidence. It then considers the use of prior statements generally to
impeach witnesses who claim to forget the substance of their prior
remarks.
I.

CONFRONTATION

Determining whether to allow prosecutors to introduce prior
statements of witnesses who forget the facts memorialized in those
statements requires trial judges to satisfy themselves first that admission will not violate the Sixth Amendment's right of confrontation. 4 For many years, whether an accused could adequately confront the declarant of a prior statement who testified at trial to a
lack of memory regarding it was a nettlesome question. It is now
less so, as the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in United States v
Owens'6 has answered the question entirely or almost entirely with
a "yes."
" This Comment does not discuss the propriety of holding a forgetful witness in con-

tempt. For examples of such exercises of the contempt power and statements of the applicable law, see Ex parte Hudgings, 249 US 378 (1919); In the Matter of Kitchen, 706 F2d 1266
(2d Cir 1983); In re Weiss, 703 F2d 653 (2d Cir 1983); United States v Appel, 211 F 495 (S
D NY 1913) (Learned Hand).
,S "A statement is not hearsay if-(1) ...[t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty
of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition ... ." FRE 801(d)(1)(A).
The rule is phrased as an exclusion from the definition of hearsay in FRE 801(c), rather
than as an exception to FRE 802's general ban on the admission of hearsay. This distinction
has no apparent interpretive significance.
'1 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him. .. ." US Const, Amend VI. The amendment's protections
extend to state proceedings. Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 403 (1965).
1 484 US 554 (1988).
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The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to "be confronted with the witnesses
against" them. Read most narrowly, the clause assures the defendant only a right to see the persons who appear at trial to testify
against him. But the clause has never been read so restrictively.
"Confront" means something more, or at least something other,
than "look at," and the term "witnesses" includes more than "persons who testify in court. 16 The chief abuse the clause seems to
target is "trial by affidavit": prosecution based not upon the testimony of live witnesses but rather upon the introduction of transcribed statements of persons not present to vouch for them or to
17
submit to cross-examination about them.
But the Confrontation Clause does not operate as a blanket
bar against introduction of out-of-court declarations of persons
who do not testify. The Supreme Court has "long rejected as unintended and too extreme" this reading which would "abrogate virtually every hearsay exception .... ."1 8 If a witness is absent, hearsay
that has sufficient "indicia of reliability"1 9 or is generally admissible under a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule20 may
support a conviction. Moreover, if a witness does testify in court,
prior statements falling within hearsay exceptions, whether firmly
or weakly rooted, are admissible so long as there is an "opportunity" at the time of trial for cross-examination upon them.2 '
Thus, when a witness claims a lack of memory about a prior
statement, there are at least two ways to analyze a Sixth Amendment challenge to its admission. One can consider the witness to
be effectively absent and ask whether the statement has sufficient
16 "[T]he Court has assumed that all hearsay declarants are 'witnesses against' a de-

fendant within the meaning of the Clause .... ." White v Illinois, 112 S Ct 736, 744 (1992)
(Thomas concurring) (emphasis in original). But Wigmore doubted this reading of the "witnesses against" language, understanding it to require only opportunity to cross-examine testifying witnesses. Wigmore, 5 Evidence § 1397 at 155-59 (cited in note 2); White, 112 S Ct
at 747 (Thomas concurring).
7 See Californiav Green, 399 US 149, 156 (1970) ("particular vice that gave impetus to
the confrontation claim was the practice of trying defendants on 'evidence' which consisted
solely of ex parte affidavits or depositions secured by the examining magistrates ...
"
Mattox v United States, 156 US 237, 242-43 (1895).
18 Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 63 (1980).
19 Id at 65-66; Dutton v Evans, 400 US 74, 89 (1970).
20 Roberts, 448 US at 66. An inquiry into reliability is not necessary for statements
admitted under hearsay exceptions with impressive historical pedigrees. See Bourjaily v
United States, 483 US 171, 182-84 (1987) (co-conspirator's statement); White, 112 S Ct at
742 n 8 (spontaneous declarations and statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment).
'2 See Owens, 484 US at 559; Green, 399 US at 159-60.
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"indicia of reliability" to merit admission. Or one can treat the
witness as present, as he is, of course, and ask whether adequate
"opportunity" for cross-examination exists. One might expect the
first approach to yield a ready conclusion where the prior statement is grand jury testimony. Grand jury testimony, though given
under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury, is offered ex
parte, without any opportunity for cross-examination by the accused. It therefore strikingly resembles the "materials [such as affidavits] ... historically abused by prosecutors as a means of depriving criminal defendants of the benefit of the adversary
process .
*."..,
Exclusion would seem appropriate. Nonetheless,
even when witnesses are genuinely absent from trial, courts often
admit their grand jury testimony when satisfied that it is reliable.2 3
The more natural approach treats the forgetful witness the
way he is: present, physically if not quite mentally. This less metaphysical approach makes the relevant question different but no
less difficult: to what extent does a government witness who denies
recollection present an accused with an opportunity for cross-examination? At the time the Supreme Court first faced this question, it was clear that a declarant who asserted a privilege against
testifying could not be confronted with respect to a prior statement.24 It was also clear that a witness who simply refused to testify, even without relying upon a valid privilege, was similarly unconfrontable; one might as well cross-examine a mannequin. 2 In
1970, California v Green26 squarely presented the issue of the for-

White, 112 S Ct at 747 (Thomas concurring).
'3 Compare, for example, United States v Gomez-Lemos, 939 F2d 326, 329-32 (6th Cir
1991) (excluding grand jury testimony) and United States v Fiore,443 F2d 112, 115 (2d Cir
1971) (same) with United States v Guinan, 836 F2d 350, 358 (7th Cir 1988) (admitting
grand jury testimony); United States v Marchini, 797 F2d 759, 764-65 (9th Cir 1986)
(same); and United States v Garner, 574 F2d 1141, 1144 (4th Cir 1978) (same). See also
McKethan v United States, consolidated with Garner v United States, 439 US 936, 938
(1978) (Stewart dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("That the evidence was first given
before a grand jury adds little to its reliability.").
"4 See Bruton v United States, 391 US 123, 128 (1968); Douglas v Alabama, 380 US
415, 419-20 (1965).
" See Douglas, 380 US at 420 (question whether assertion of privilege valid deemed
immaterial to analysis).
26 399 US 149 (1970).
12
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but five members of the Supreme Court declined

California v Green

California v Green involved a government witness whose
memory lasted just up until trial and then disappeared. The witness had made statements, clearly inculpating Green as a marijuana supplier, both to an investigator and at a preliminary hearing at which Green's attorney had cross-examined the witness. But
at trial, about ten weeks after the alleged sale and two months after the preliminary hearing, the witness's memory of Green's role
in the sale had vanished.2 e After an unsuccessful attempt to refresh
the witness's recollection with his prior statements, the prosecution
introduced both-the statement to the investigator and the preliminary hearing testimony-as substantive evidence under the
California Evidence Code's broad hearsay exception for prior in30
consistent statements.
Green argued not that the witness's memory loss denied him
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, but, more broadly,
that the admission of the prior statements, remembered or not,
was itself unconstitutional." California's rule permitting the introduction of prior inconsistent statements for more than impeachment purposes was a reversal of traditional hearsay doctrine, which
refused to admit prior statements of a witness generally.3 2 In rejecting the traditional rule, the California legislature had expressed
its then progressive view that cross-examination upon a statement
well after it had been made can neutralize its hearsay dangers, at
least when the statement is inconsistent with present testimony.3
27 This is a slight overstatement. The Court was reviewing the California Supreme

Court's invalidation of a rule exempting all prior inconsistent statements from hearsay strictures. See id at 150-51. The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the state rule, see id at
153, but held that the narrower issue-of whether the rule could be constitutionally applied
to admit a statement now forgotten-was not appropriate for decision since the state court
had not passed upon it. See id at 168-69.
28 Justices Marshall and Blackmun took no part in the decision. Justices Harlan and
Brennan in respective concurring and dissenting opinions resolved the question and reached
opposite results. See id at 188-89 (Harlan concurring) (forgetful witness available for Sixth
Amendment purposes); id at 194 (Brennan dissenting) (unavailable).
29

Id at 151-52.

30

Id at 152. The state's codified exception was a recent one, having taken effect in

1967. Id at 150.
31 Id at 150-51, 155.
32

Id at 154-55.

"3See Cal Evid Code § 1235 (comment) (West 1966), reprinted in part in Notes of
Advisory Committee, FRE 801(d)(1)(A).
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The Supreme Court reached the identical conclusion in the Sixth
Amendment context.
The conclusion flowed readily from the Court's premise that
the Confrontation Clause furthers the same triad of goals as the
hearsay rule itself: insuring that judgments are based on sworn testimony whose declarants' demeanors are observable, and which is
3 4 Introduction of the prior statesusceptible to cross-examination.
ments of a present witness could not frustrate the first two objectives regardless of whether the statements were consistent or inconsistent, sworn or unsworn. The traditional requirement that
examiners lay a foundation for the introduction of prior statements
by asking the witness to affirm or deny the making of the statement and its truth permitted the trier of fact to examine the demeanor of the witness as he commented upon the prior statement
35
under oath.
The Confrontation Clause's requirement of cross-examination
of testifying witnesses, and "full and effective" cross at that,"
posed a somewhat greater difficulty. To be sure, the witness's testimony at the preliminary hearing had been subjected to earlier
cross-examination and the Court considered this enough, as even
the prior, cross-examined testimony of absent witnesses had been
held to withstand Confrontation Clause challenge.3 " This reasoning
could not, however, overcome an objection to the introduction of a
witness's uncrossed statements, such as the statement to the investigator. For this, the Court looked to California's requirement of
inconsistency.3 8 Present inconsistency could make up for the lack
of past cross-examination, as the testifying witness would be forced
by the inconsistency, in effect, to cross-examine himself. To affirm
the truth of what he presently says in the face of a past contradiction would require the witness to attack his earlier statement as
well as he could to preserve his credibility. The witness himself
would supply the' cross-examination that had not occurred
earlier.3 9
See Green, 399 US at 158.
-1 "Thus, as far as the oath is concerned, the witness must now affirm, deny, or qualify
the truth of the prior statement under the penalty of perjury ... ." Id at 158-59.
36 Id at 158.
37 See Mattox, 156 US at 240-44 (approving admission of transcript of trial testimony
given by witnesses who had since died).
33 Green, 399 US at 159-61.
3' "The most successful cross-examination at the time the prior statement was made
could hardly hope to accomplish more than has already been accomplished by the fact that
31

the witness is now telling a different, inconsistent story ....

."

Id at 159.
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The Court's premise-that confrontation serves the same
goals as the hearsay rule-was convenient, permitting the Court to
use the same arguments to rescue the rule from invalidation that
had persuaded the legislature to recognize the hearsay exception in
the first place. But these arguments put the Court in a box when it
tried to address the next question: whether Green had adequate
opportunity to confront the witness who did not contradict, but
only forgot, what he said before. Such a witness did not "necessarily assume a position as to the truth value of his prior statement.
•..-40 To the contrary, he could assume no position at all, making
him quite useless to the defense for attacking his prior statement.
All the Court felt confident to do was to remand to the state court
for a determination of whether the "lapse of memory so affected
Green's right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in
the application of the Confrontation Clause ...."',
Justice Harlan's concurrence attempted to extricate the Court
from this bind, but the attempt required him to reject the very
premise from which the Court had started. Confrontation was not
a right to "full and effective cross-examination" but simply a right
to have all available witnesses-witnesses who could be produced-presented at trial.42 Though language equating confrontation with cross-examination riddled previous opinions, Harlan harmonized the early cases and dicta as merely guaranteeing the
attendance of witnesses who would testify against criminal defendants as surely as the Compulsory Process Clause assured the attendance of those who would testify in their favor. 43 By conceiving
the right as a right to have all witnesses who can attend do so,
Harlan could explain why the Court had, on the one hand, countenanced the introduction of prior cross-examined testimony when a
witness had died,4 4 as well as unsworn dying declarations,4 5 but
had, on the other hand, excluded prior testimony where circumstances suggested that the disappearance of a witness was due to
the government's carelessness. 46 Since Harlan viewed confrontation
as a mere attendance right, a witness's forgetfulness was immaterial. "The fact that the witness, though physically available, cannot
recall either the underlying events that are the subject of an extra-

40

41
42

Id at 160.
Id at 168-69.
Id at 182 (Harlan concurring).

43 Id.

44 See
41
41

Mattox, 156 US at 244.
See id at 243-44, construing Mattox, 146 US at 151-52.
See Motes v United States, 178 US 458, 471 (1900).
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judicial statement or previous testimony or recollect the circumstances under which the statement was given, does not have Sixth
Amendment consequence.
47
available.

.

.

. The witness is, in my view,

Opinions more recently preceding Green, however, complicated Harlan's analysis. Pointer v Texas,48 which bound state
courts to respect the Confrontation Clause, had stated that "[ilt
cannot seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of
cross-examination is included in the right of [confrontation]. 49
Particularly troublesome was Douglas v Alabama,50 which had disapproved of a prosecutor's attempt to refresh a witness's recollection with hearsay inculpating the defendant when the witness refused, without any valid privilege, to comment upon the alleged
crime. In Douglas, the witness was plainly present, and his statement had not even been formally introduced into evidence. But it
was the improper inference of truth that the jury might have
drawn from hearing the statement without having the statement's
utterance or substance established through cross-examination that
condemned the Alabama court's procedure. 51 For confrontation
purposes, Douglas held, presence was not enough if it was only
stonewalling. 2
B. After Green
Green's remand to the state court to determine whether the
witness's memory loss "so affected Green's right to cross-examine
as to make a critical difference in the application of the Confrontation Clause"53 left lower courts with little guidance for disposing of
similar challenges. In the face of this ambiguity, some courts took
shelter under Harlan's rationale for admission of hearsay by forgetful witnesses.
17

Green, 399 US at 188 (Harlan concurring).

Is 380 US 400 (1965).
"

Id at 404.

50 380 US 415 (1965).
6' See id at 419.

s' Justice Harlan reconciled Douglas with the views he expressed in Green by understanding it to require reversal only when the sole convicting evidence is hearsay. "The result
in Douglas v. Alabama, to which I also still adhere, can be rationalized under this test since
there the inadmissible confession 'constituted the only direct evidence' that petitioner had
committed the murder." Green, 399 US at 187 n 20 (Harlan concurring). Harlan would have
remanded Green for determination of whether the victim-witness's statement was too unreliable "as a matter of due process" rather than confrontation. Id at 189. See also Green, 399
US at 170 n 19.
63 Id at 168.
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In the Second Circuit, for example, United States v Insana,54
a case decided two weeks prior to argument in Green, had established that memory loss was irrelevant. And notwithstanding the
Green majority's emphasis upon opportunity for "full and effective
55
cross-examination" as the touchstone of confrontation analysis,
several lower courts after Green found that simple opportunity for
cross-examination of testifying witnesses, no matter how full or
empty, would suffice for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. On
remand, the California Supreme Court affirmed Green's conviction
on this reasoning.56 And the Fourth Circuit followed suit a few
years later in United States v Payne,57 where the admission of an
unsworn statement of a witness who professed not only total lack
of recollection at trial but also a partial lack at the time of the
making of the statement, did not run afoul of the Confrontation
Clause. The Payne court conceded that the memory loss at issue
was more severe than in Green, but found Harlan's seemingly absolute approach to be preferable because of the difficulty of drawing a line between memory loss so complete as to be unconfrontable and mere lapses which were not.5 s The Third and Sixth
Circuits similarly declined to draw any lines in United States ex
rel Thomas v Cuyler59 and United States v Distler ° respectively.
Other courts did, if not draw, at least sketch lines. For the
Eighth Circuit in United States v Rogers,61 the admission of a
prior statement to impeach a witness who later forgot its substance
did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment because the court was
satisfied of the minor role the statement had played. Other materials had "amply refuted" the testimony of the witness.6 2 "Thus the
out-of-court statement, considered as impeachment, was not crucial to the government's case, and any inability on the part of the
jury to weigh that statement's credibility could not have

423 F2d 1165, 1168 (2d Cir 1970).
55 Green, 399 US at 159.
56People v Green, 3 Cal 3d 981, 92 Cal Rptr 494, 479 P2d 998, 1003-04 (1971).
57 492 F2d 449, 452-54 (4th Cir 1974).
58See id at 453-54. Even Harlan's position was not quite as absolute as the Payne court
and others made it out to seem. For though Harlan considered confrontation as the right
merely to question available witnesses, his concurrence noted that due process concerns
would arise if prior statements of witnesses who did not offer satisfying answers at trial
served as the only basis for conviction. See note 52. See also Bridges u Wixon, 326 US 135,
153-54 (1945) (censuring convictions based solely upon "unsworn testimony of witnesses").
" 548 F2d 460, 462-63 (3d Cir 1977).
60 671 F2d 954, 958-59 (6th Cir 1981).
81 549 F2d 490 (8th Cir 1976).
82 Id at 500.
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prejudiced appellant."6 3 The Rogers approach, emphasizing the
weight the hearsay played in the conviction, enunciated the harmless-error principle in the confrontation context, without stating it
as such. 4 The error could be harmless where, as in Rogers, the
hearsay provided only cumulative evidence 65 or, presumably, where
the hearsay was unusually reliable. Other courts also found forgetful witnesses confrontable if their memory losses were only partial.
But the intuition for admission of the witnesses' statements was
not so much satisfaction with the opportunity for cross-examination upon them, but rather suspicion that the memory losses were
feigned. The courts in Vogel v Percy6 6 and United States v
Shoupe 7 rejected confrontation challenges where they found the
witness's memory loss so "selective as to be incredible." 6' 1
C.

United States v Owens

No federal appellate court" held that a witness's memory loss
made him unconfrontable until 1986, when the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of a prisoner for beating a corrections officer.7 0 The officer, though able to make an identification of the
prisoner shortly after the beating, could not do so at trial. His
memory of many events before and after the attack was absent as
well because of the brain damage he had sustained, although he
did recall making the identification while in the hospital. 1 Under
the circumstances, the Ninth Circuit considered the admission of
72
the identification statement to violate the Sixth Amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed.7 3 Recalling its earlier uncertainty in California v Green, the Court answered the question it

63

Id.

The use of harmless error analysis in the Confrontation Clause context was sanctioned in Harringtonv California, 395 US 250, 254 (1969). See also Idaho v Wright, 497 US
805, 823-24 (1990).
11 See also United States v DiCaro, 772 F2d 1314, 1325-28 (7th Cir 1985) (jury could
determine truth of hearsay from other testimony given by witness).
46 691 F2d 843, 845-46 (7th Cir 1982).
67 548 F2d 636, 643 (6th Cir 1977). The Shoupe court reversed the conviction nonetheless on due process grounds. Id.
"8See also DiCaro,772 F2d at 1326; United States v Baker, 722 F2d 343, 348-49 (7th
Cir 1983); Insana, 423 F2d at 1170.
" An Illinois appellate court sustained a Sixth Amendment challenge to the testimony
of a forgetful witness. See People v Yarbrough, 166 IMIApp 3d 825, 520 NE2d 1116, 1120
(1988), citing Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415 (1965).
70 United States v Owens, 789 F2d 750 (9th Cir 1986).
71 Id at 752-53.
"

7' Id at 761.
738United States

v Owens, 484 US 554 (1988).
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had left open there. The Court opted for Justice Harlan's reading,
and held that the defense's opportunity to cross-examine the amnesic victim was adequate to satisfy confrontational constraints
even if the cross-examination proved less satisfying than it might
have otherwise.7 4 It was still possible to bring out on cross-examination the "witness' bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his
poor eyesight, and even (what is often a prime objective of crossexamination) the very fact that he has a bad memory. ' 75 That the
cross-examination might not achieve its objective was not problematic since "successful cross-examination is not the constitutional
guarantee. '76 The Court held, as Harlan had urged it to eighteen
years earlier, that a witness's memory loss has no Sixth Amendment consequences.
To bolster its conclusion, the Court cited its recent opinion in
Delaware v Fensterer.7 Fensterer presented a Sixth Amendment
challenge to the admission of an expert opinion whose basis the
expert had forgotten at trial. Here the Court held that the opportunity cross-examination had afforded to impugn the expert's present lack of memory satisfied the Confrontation Clause. 78 For the
six-member majority,7 9 Owens was indistinguishable. In both cases,
the witness testified to the formation of a belief whose basis could
not now be recalled. Cross-examination, though perhaps impaired,
was not futile since the validity of the belief was open to impeachment by, if nothing else, the "very fact that [the witness] has a bad
memory."80
One may question the Court's analogy to Fensterer.An expert
witness, like the witness in Fensterer,may be impeached by bad
memory because it reflects adversely on his acuity and, by implication, his expertise. In contrast, the credibility of the prior statement of a fact witness, like the witness in Owens, would not appear
to be affected by evidence that the witness generally has a poor
memory unless the prior statement itself was made well after the
event in question. The expert's memory loss is "self-impeaching"
in a way that the fact witness's memory loss is not.81

"' See id at 559.
75 Id

(citation omitted).

78 Id at 560.
77 474 US 15 (1985) (per curiam).
78See id at 21-22.
71Justice Kennedy did not participate. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented.
" Owens, 484 US at 559.
81 See id at 570 (Brennan dissenting).
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Notwithstanding the weakness of the analogy to Fensterer,
Owens' answer to Green's question leaves little room for future argument for Sixth Amendment exclusion of prior statements of forgetful witnesses. By its own terms, Owens is the definitive answer
to the Green question, and a narrow construction of its holding is
probably improper. 2 However, two arguments for exclusion may
remain viable after Owens.
The Owens victim-witness did not recall the identity of his assailant at trial, but he did recall making the identification, 3 and
this circumstance may permit distinction. The opportunity to
cross-examine a witness who recalls at least the making of a statement permits inquiry into the circumstances under which the
statement was made. Such a witness may testify to circumstances
that cast doubt on its veracity. For example, he may, by being able
to recall the making of the statement, recall that he was lying or
uncertain when he made it." A witness like the one in Owens, who
recalls making an identification from mug shots, may also recall,
upon cross-examination, conditions that will permit defense counsel to argue that the procedures used to procure the identification
were suggestive. This line of inquiry was open to defense counsel in
Owens, and in remarking upon the opportunities for cross-examination and confrontation that still exist when a witness pleads forgetfulness, the Owens Court was careful to note this one.8 Lines of
inquiry like this-exploration of the witness's recollection of special circumstances that might permit a fuller evaluation of a statement's reliability-are of course blocked when not only the content
but the making of the statement are forgotten.8 6
See Cowin v Bresler, 741 F2d 410, 425 (DC Cir 1984).
See Owens, 484 US at 556. Although declining to find an infringement of the confrontation right, the Seventh Circuit in DiCaro, a pre-Owens decision, found the witness's
professed failure to recall not only the subject matter but the making of the prior statement
a circumstance that made the case more difficult. 772 F2d at 1327.
84 Or drunk. See State v Cochran, 172 W Va 715, 310 SE2d 476, 478 (1983) (witness
remembered making statement while intoxicated, but did not remember content).
83 See Owens, 484 US at 560. It did so, even though Harlan's Green concurrence, which
Owens endorsed, had considered memory of the making of the statement to be as immaterial to Sixth Amendment analysis as memory of its substance. See Green, 399 US at 188
(Harlan concurring).
8 The Supreme Court's decision in Nelson v O'Neil, 402 US 622 (1971), does not reject
this distinction. In O'Neil, the Court held that a co-defendant's failure to recall (or more
accurately, denial of) the making of a statement that the prosecution had introduced to
impeach the co-defendant's testimony did not make him unconfrontable. Id at 629-30. However, the O'Neil witness possessed (or at least claimed, to possess) the kind of memory the
Owens witness did not: memory of the facts underlying his alleged prior statement. The codefendant in O'Neil vigorously denied that his prior statement inculpating the defendant
82
83
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A second, post-Owens confrontation argument may still be
available where there is reason to believe the forgetfulness is
feigned. 7 This may seem counterintuitive. Feigned forgetfulness
suggests tampering by the defense, and, to be sure, a defendant
who obstructs justice in this way forfeits the Sixth Amendment's
protections. 8 But feigned forgetfulness may be due to other
causes, 89 none of which are attributable to the defendant whose
confrontation right is at stake. Even in the absence of defense intimidation, the witness may fear recrimination for unfavorable testimony. Or the witness may have lied at a grand jury proceeding,
and, now regretful, may wish to minimize the impact of the lie
without laying the solid foundation for a perjury conviction that
inconsistent trial and grand jury testimony provide.
More significantly, it may be the prosecution that has induced
the witness to assert forgetfulness. A prosecutor may have a witness who has made a helpful prior statement but whom he wishes
to shield from meaningful cross-examination. Under the circumstances, the prosecutor might direct the witness to feign forgetfulness and hope that the judge will permit him to place the prior
statement before the trier of fact under the guise of impeachment
of the seemingly hostile witness.9 0 The old "voucher" rule, which
barred parties from impeaching their own witnesses, was an attempt to bar ruses like this. But the modern Federal Rules permit
impeachment on direct examination,"' so the danger of a prosecutor procuring forgetfulness as a means of placing hearsay before a
jury exists. It is, of course, difficult to know whether this kind of
prosecutorial misbehavior occurs to any significant extent. But
since it is very close to the sort of prosecutorial misconduct the
Confrontation Clause seems intended to prevent-trial by ex parte
affidavit-an argument for beefing up the Clause's requirement of

was true. Id at 624. Thus there was clearly opportunity for meaningful cross-examination of
the declarant in O'Neil in a way there is not when the witness has memory of neither a
statement's subject matter nor its utterance.
87 Where the statement is not one of identification, this is the only circumstance under
which the statement is substantively admissible. See Section II.B.
88 See Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 158 (1878) (no confrontation challenge
where witness's absence procured by defense).
" As Judge Friendly observed in Taylor v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 344 F2d 281,
284 (2d Cir 1965), "mere failure of a witness to repeat a prior statement helpful to the
proponent gives an exceedingly slight basis for drawing the inference [of witness
intimidation]."
90 See text accompanying notes 137-139.
91 See FRE 607.
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opportunity for cross-examination when the forgetfulness seems
feigned may be viable even after Owens.
To draw a distinction between Owens and cases where the forgetfulness seems feigned 92 might also help to square Owens with
3 a case Owens
the Court's 1965 decision in Douglas v Alabama,"
did not purport to overrule. In Douglas, the Court censured questioning of a defiantly silent witness about his recollection of a past
statement where the prosecutor's objective seemed to be to sneak
hearsay into the record. Douglas broadly held that present yet unresponsive witnesses are unconfrontable.9 4 Owens, whose opinion
does not mention the case, necessarily narrows the Douglas holding; one way to understand what remains of Douglas is that it only
applies to cases with a specter of prosecutorial misconduct." In
Douglas, the Court detected misconduct in the prosecutor's questioning of a witness about a statement long after it became apparent that the witness would not respond. Where a government witness unconvincingly forgets and the prosecutor attempts to
introduce a prior statement under Rule 801(d) (1) (A) or impeach
with it under Rule 607, an inference of prosecutorial misconduct,
though weaker, may still be tenable and may permit a distinction
from Owens, in which the genuineness of the witness's memory loss
seems to have been assumed.
IL

SUBSTANTIVE ADMISSION

While the Confrontation Clause may not exclude witness
statements whose basis or utterance has been forgotten, an additional question, present in both civil and criminal contexts, remains: whether the rules of evidence admit them. Prior statements
of witnesses, when offered to prove what they assert, fall squarely
within the definition of hearsay."" As a result, traditional principles
of evidence generally excluded them, or at least severely limited
their use. Unless the statement came within an established hearsay
exception, prior statements were admissible only as impeachment

And of course where there are no special indicators of procurement by the defense.
" 380 US 415 (1965).
9" Id at 419-20.
1 Justice Harlan proposed this means of understanding Douglas. "An additional factor
would move me to stand by Douglas. It was a case of prosecutorial misconduct. By placing
the witness on the stand and reading in the confession, the prosecutor, in effect, increased
the reliability of the confession in the jury's eyes in view of the witness' apparent acquiescence as opposed to repudiation." Green, 399 US at 187 n 20 (Harlan concurring).
96See note 1.
"
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material-evidence offered only to cast doubt upon the truthful97
ness of a witness's testimony.
The sense of this strict view came from consideration of the
three concerns underlying the hearsay rule: its preference for evidence that is given under oath by a person who is subject to crossexamination and whose demeanor may be observed by the trier of
fact. e8 The admission of prior statements does not square well with
this preference. The trier of fact can observe only the present demeanor of a witness as he utters his present testimony; his demeanor at the time he made a prior statement is unobservable.
And though some prior statements, such as those made at a deposition hearing, are given under oath and subject to cross-examination when made, 'past cross-examination concerning a prior statement is, all other things being equal, an inferior substitute for
contemporaneous cross-examination: the present factfinder cannot
observe the demeanor of a declarant as he makes a statement if he
made it at a different proceeding. 9
These arguments, though logical, were only weakly persuasive
to many who gave them much thought.10 Wigmore criticized the
blanket bar because of what he considered to be its inordinate emphasis upon contemporaneous cross-examination. Althoigh hearsay by a declarant not available to testify cannot of course be
probed, a witness's prior statement has been made by a declarant
who is present and who can now comment upon it. "[T]he theory
of the hearsay rule is that an extrajudicial statement is rejected
because it was made out of court by an absent person not subject
" See Weinstein and Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence § 801(d)(1)[01] at 801-128 to -129
(cited in note 6).
98Notes of Advisory Committee, Introductory Note: The Hearsay Problem, FRE, Art
VIII.
" Testimony may also "harden" if cross-examination is postponed. See State v
Saporen, 205 Minn 358, 285 NW 898, 901 (1939):
The chief merit of cross-examination is not that at some future time it gives the party
opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its principal virtue is in its immediate
application of the testing process. Its strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testimony
is apt to harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the
witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestions of others,
whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth.
See also Ruhala v Roby, 379 Mich 102, 150 NW2d 146, 156-58 (1967) (lamenting "windmillfighting nature of stale cross-examination" upon prior statements).
100 See, for example, Edmund M. Morgan, HearsayDangers and the Application of the
Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv L Rev 177, 193 (1948) ("Why does falsehood harden any more
quickly or unyieldingly than truth? .. .Isn't the opportunity for reconsideration and for
baneful influence by others even more likely to color the later testimony than the prior
statement?").
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to cross-examination[ ].Here, however, by hypothesis the witness
is present and subject to cross-examination. There is ample opportunity to test him as to the basis for his former statement.'' 1 1
To the complaint that the demeanor of the declarant as he
makes the statement is invisible to the trier of fact, Learned Hand,
himself a former district court judge, thought he had an answer.
"If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that
what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before [is the
truth], they are none the less deciding from what they see and hear
of that person and in court."'1 2 The demeanor of the witness under
oath, as he tries to explain or deny a prior statement, could reveal
as much as viewing the witness when he originally made the
statement.
Critics of the traditional rule also advanced affirmative arguments for admission of prior statements. McCormick thought their
admission as substantive evidence not only did not offend the
hearsay rule, but in fact advanced its overarching objective-securing reliable evidence.
[P]rior statements are not merely of equal reliability ... but
are superior in trustworthiness. This is the obvious truth,
which the voluble readiness of witnesses tends to obscure,
that memory hinges upon recency. The prior statement is always nearer and usually very much nearer to the event than is
the testimony. 3The fresher the memory, the fuller and more
10
accurate it is.
Those who wished to revise the traditional rule also questioned its effectiveness in the many cases in which a hearsay statement's inconsistency with present testimony made it already admissible as impeachment evidence. True, a limiting instruction
would accompany any impeaching use of the statement. But doubt
as to the effectiveness and/or intelligibility of the instruction made
even those who accepted the logic of the rule's traditional arguments skeptical of the rule's effectiveness. 4 A final argument for
the admission of prior statements is the ammunition such state-

101Wigmore, 3A Evidence § 1018 at 996 (cited in note 2).
102 Di Carlo v United States, 6 F2d 364, 368 (2d Cir 1925).
103Charles T. McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 Tex L Rev 573, 577 (1947) (emphasis in original).
I"' See Weinstein and Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence § 801(d)(1)(A)[01] at 801-134 &
nn 1, 2 (cited in note 6).
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ments offered against the "turncoat" or "flipped" witness-the
witness who changes his story once he takes the stand. 10 5
These criticisms and arguments were persuasive to the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Their original draft followed
the example of Model Code of Evidence Rule 503 and Uniform
Rule of Evidence Rule 63 in excluding a witness's prior statements
from the very definition of hearsay, 10 6 provided the witness is subject to cross-examination "concerning" them at trial. But the revised draft sent to Congress cut back on the breadth of this formulation, instead specifying in Rule 801(d)(1) only three situations in
which a prior statement by a non-party witness 10 7 "testif[ying] at
the trial or hearing and [] subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement" would be admissible. The statement would be admissible if it were a "statement of identification,"'' 08 the type at
issue in Owens, a statement consistent with present testimony used
to rehabilitate an impeached witness 0 9 or, most important for this
discussion, a statement ?inconsistent with the declarant's
testimony." 10
Congress also added to the "inconsistent statement" exception"' the requirement that the statement have been made under
oath and subject to the penalty of perjury. 1 2 This amendment excluded run-of-the-mill inconsistent statements, but permitted the
use of grand jury and deposition testimony against turncoat witnesses. Since these latter materials, are stenographically transcribed, there is at least assurance that the statement offered has
in fact been made, even if the guarantees of truthfulness the oath
and perjury penalty provide are dubious.
The inconsistent statement provision is the primary field on
which battles over prior statements of forgetful witnesses occur.

105 See McCormick, 25 Tex L Rev at 575 (cited in note 103).
108 See Weinstehi and Berger, 4 Weinstein's Evidence § 801(d)(1)[01] at 801-131 to 132 (cited in note 6).
107 That is, a non-party who also is not involved in a conspirator, agent, or employee
relationship with a party. See FRE 801(d)(2).
208 FRE 801(d)(1)(C).
108FRE 801(d)(1)(B).
210

FRE 801(d)(1)(A).

This Comment refers to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as an exception to the hearsay rule (FRE
802), even though it is technically an exclusion from the hearsay definition (FRE 801(c)).
The distinction is immaterial. See note 13.
112 See FRE 801(d)(1)(A). The revision placed the exclusion in its current form: "A
statement is not hearsay if... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject
to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with
the declarant's testimony, and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition.. .." Id.
2
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Two questions arise when a party seeks to introduce the prior
grand jury or deposition testimony of a witness who responds "I
don't remember" to a question he once had the ability to answer:
first, whether the forgetful witness is "subject to cross-examination," a condition of admission for all three types of prior statements 801(d)(1) refers to; and second, whether the witness's lack of
memory is inconsistent with his earlier testimony, as the
801(d) (1) (A) exception alone requires.
A.

Subject to Cross-Examination Concerning the Statement

Rule 801(d) (1) 's requirement that the declarant of a statement
be present and "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" is rooted in the theory that present cross-examination about
a statement can be an adequate substitute for the cross-examination that failed to occur when the statement was made. 113 Nevertheless, applying it to the case in which a witness is present to
testify but has forgotten either the basis for his statement or the
making of the statement puzzled even the Advisory Committee,
which questioned whether the requirement was satisfied when the
witness testified to a lack of memory." 4 The question the Committee raised in the statutory context was similar, if not identical, to
the one Green posed in the constitutional context. And like the
question posed by Green, this one too Owens substantially
resolved.
Owens held that "subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement" simply expresses the requirement that a witness be
"placed on the stand, under oath, and respond[] willingly to questions." 115 Although the Court conceded that assertions of privilege
or restrictions on questioning might make a testifying witness not
subject to cross-examination, the scope of the statutory language
seemed to the Court to reach no further than the Sixth Amendment's. 116 Like the Confrontation Clause, the rule assured only an
opportunity for cross-examination; it did not require the witness to

See Notes of Advisory Committee, FRE 801(d)(1).
"' See Notes of Advisory Committee, FRE 803(5). In explaining why it did not treat
recorded recollection as a definitional exclusion and place it in Rule 801(d)(1), the Committee explained: "That category [Rule 801(d)(1) hearsay exclusions] [ ]requires that declarant
be 'subject to cross-examination,' as to which the impaired memory aspect of the [recorded
recollection] exception raises doubts." Id.
Owens, 484 US at 561.
1M3

1 See id at 561-62.
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be subject to cross-examination as fully as the opponent might
wish."
The chief argument the Court offered for this narrow reading
of Rule 801(d)(1) was a comparison of the rule's language with that
of Rule 804(a)(3).118 Rule 804 contains an assortment of hearsay
exceptions that apply when the witness "testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of [his] statement"'1 9 or is otherwise
"unavailable." The precision of this language contrasts with the
vagueness of 801(d)(1)'s "concerning the statement" phrase, and
the Court believed had the drafters of 801(d) (1) wished to give the
"subject to cross-examination" requirement some teeth, they could
have specified that the witness be subject to cross-examination
concerning the subject matter of the statement. 12 0 This phrasing
would have more clearly expressed an intent to exclude statements
describing underlying events the witness has now forgotten, and,
as 804(a)(3) demonstrated, was well within the drafters' vocab2
ulary.1 1
The Court's comparison with 804(a)(3) has force, but perhaps
not enough to support the argument which the Court was trying to
make. To be sure, it would be odd to read 801(d)(1) to require
perfect memory of the subject matter of the witness's testimony. It
would be odd not just because of the contrasting language of
804(a)(3), but also because one of the reasons for admitting prior
statements and identifications (as in Owens) is the superior quality
of memory at the time such statements are made. But to say that
801(d)(1) does not require perfect memory is not to say that it requires none at all, as the Owens Court did.
And by giving the "subject to cross-examination" language of
801(d)(1) the limited scope it did, the Court brought the language
close to being surplusage. Rule 801(d)(1) already requires the declarant to be "testif[ying] at trial" and most testifying witnesses
will also be "subject to cross-examination" in the narrow Owens
sense by virtue of their testimonial appearance.' 2 2 Owens does
state the additional requirement that the witness "respond willingly" to questions on cross-examination, 2 3 so if the witness in-

117

Id.

118 Id at 562-64.
118 FRE 804(a)(3) (emphasis added).
120

Owens, 484 US at 562.

121 See id.
122 Of

course, if the statement is an oral one, recounted through a later witness, it may

be necessary to recall the declarant to satisfy the rule.
123

484 US at 561.
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vokes a privilege or refuses to answer outright on cross-examination, he is not "subject to cross-examination" within the meaning
of 801(d)(1). But introduction of a prior inconsistent statement
under 801(d)(1)(A) is already subject to Rule 613(b)'s requirement
that an opponent be "afforded the opportunity to interrogate the
witness thereon."124 "Subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement" adds little to this under the interpretation adopted in
Owens.
Perhaps a more satisfying reading of the phrase "subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement" in the context of
Rule 801(d)(1)(A)-and one that could be reconciled with
Owens-would insist that the witness have a memory of making
the statement though not necessarily its basis. This reading assures
that the cross-examiner will at least be able to elicit testimony
125
about the circumstances under which the statement was made.
It also fits well with the language and structure of the Federal
Rules. The reading avoids the problem of redundancy with the opportunity requirement of Rule 613126 and gives the phrase "concerning the statement" some flesh. At the same time, it accounts
for the difference in wording between 804(a)(3) and 801(d)(1), the
first requiring lack of memory as to "the subject matter" of a state.2 FRE 613(b): "Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is
not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same
and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the
interests of justice otherwise require." The only clear difference between Rule 613(b) and
Owens' reading of Rule 801(d)(1) is that the protections of Rule 613(b), unlike the "subject
to cross-examination" requirement of 801(d)(1), may be dispensed with where the interests
of justice or the impracticalities of recalling a witness so require. However, where the extrinsic evidence is introduced not only to impeach but as substantive evidence under Rule
801(d)(1), the case against exercising such discretion will be very strong. "The need for a
full explanation is particularly great under the federal rules in those instances where the
inconsistent statement may be given substantive effect .... Prior inconsistent statements
that determine whether the case can reach the jury or that relate to crucial testimony
should almost never be admitted if foundational requirements can be, but have not been,
met." Weinstein and Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence § 613[04] at 613-28 to -29 (cited in
note 6).
I'l The fact that a forgetful witness remembered making a particular statement contributed to the holding that the witness was subject to cross-examination in United States v
Bigham, 812 F2d 943, 946 (5th Cir 1987). And in United States v DiCaro,the court recognized "that in many or perhaps most cases in which the witness suffers a total memory lapse
concerning both the prior statement and its contents, the witness cannot be considered subject to cross-examination concerning the statement under the Rule." 772 F2d at 1323 (holding nonetheless that the witness, who claimed a total memory lapse, was subject to crossexamination).
"2"For an example of this redundancy after Owens, see United States v Bonnett, 877
F2d 1450, 1462 (10th Cir 1989) (both 801(d)(1) and 613(b) require giving witness opportunity to deny or explain inconsistency).
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ment, the sbcond only speaking of cross-examination "concerning"
one. Owens' holding may be amenable to this narrow construction,
as the victim-witness there did recall making the identification.1 2
B.

Inconsistency

Owens concerned statements of identification, admitted under
Rule 801(d)(1)(C), for which lack of clear recollection at trial is
expected. The exception for prior grand jury or deposition testimony, where forgetfulness at trial may seem more suspect, appears
in Rule 801(d) (1) (A). Here the rule requires not only that the witness be "subject to cross-examination concerning" the testimony,
but also that the testimony be "inconsistent" with that offered at
the present trial.
The law of evidence, even as it excluded prior witness 'statements as substantive evidence, traditionally permitted the limited
use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach.' 2 8 The test of inconsistency for impeachment has been fairly loose. To be inconsistent, a statement does not have to be directly contradictory. Inconsistency by implication or omission satisfies the test.12 But it is
hard to argue that the statement "I don't remember" is even impliedly inconsistent with past knowledge. 30 Present failure of recollection does not in any way contradict the existence of knowledge
formerly held.
Out of frustration and a suspicion of witness-tampering more
than anything else, judges often hold that prior statements forgotten by witnesses are inconsistent enough to impeach their lack of
memory when they disbelieve the witnesses' assertions of memory
lapse.'' The same occurs with prior statements introduced as substantive evidence, even in the face of a statutory inconsistency re-

127
128
129

484 US at 556.
See Notes of Advisory Committee, FRE 801(d)(1)(A).
"It is enough if the proffered testimony, taken as a whole, either by what it says or

by what it omits to say, affords some indication that the fact was different from the testimony of the witness whom it is sought to contradict." United States v Barrett, 539 F2d 244,
254 (1st Cir 1976).
130 One must of course distinguish those situations in which speakers carefully say "I
don't recall that" or "I don't remember that happening" to simply mean "no." See, for
example, United States v Williams, 737 F2d 594, 607 (7th Cir 1984) (witness qualified answer "to the best of [my] memory").
121 See, for example, United States v Rogers, 549 F2d 490, 496 (8th Cir 1976) and text
accompanying note 88.
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quirement. 13 ' Judges often admit the grand jury testimony of witnesses who deny remembering its substance at trial, relying upon
Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 1 as and appellate courts have upheld the admissions. As in the impeachment context, a broad notion of "inconsistency" informs decisions construing 801(d)(1)(A). Inconsistency
"may be found in evasive answers, ... [or] silence,"1 "4 and "a purported change in memory can produce 'inconsistent' answers. "135
As Judge Friendly stated in United States v Marchand,' "if a
witness has testified to [certain] facts before a grand jury and forgets ... them at trial, his grand jury testimony ... falls squarely
within Rule 801(d)(1)(A). ' 13 7 Most courts have agreed, 38 at least
to the extent that the memory loss appears to be feigned."3 9

132 See, for example, Williams, 737 F2d at 608 ("[W]e do not read the word 'inconsistent' in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) to include only statements diametrically opposed or logically
incompatible").
133 If it is a defendant who seeks to introduce the transcript of a forgetful witness's
grand jury testimony, it may be admitted as the "former testimony" of an "unavailable"
witness, without regard to inconsistency. See FRE 804(b)(1). See also United States v Salerno, 112 S Ct 2503, 2506-08 (1992) (construing exception). The lack of memory renders the
witness unavailable, FRE 804(a)(3), and if the court is satisfied that the prosecution's motive to test the accuracy of the witness's grand jury statement was "similar" to the motive it
had at trial, the statement is admissible. FRE 801(b)(1). See, for example, United States v
Miller, 904 F2d 65, 68 (DC Cir 1990) (citing cases). The court may not be so satisfied, however, if the issue the statement concerns has assumed a much greater significance at trial
than it did before the grand jury. See Salerno, 112 S Ct at 2512 (Stevens dissenting). In this
case, a defendant facing a forgetful witness must turn, just as the prosecution must, to Rule
801(d)(1)(A).
13, United States v Dennis, 625 F2d 782, 795 (8th Cir 1980).
133 Williams, 737 F2d at 608.
138 564 F2d 983 (2d Cir 1977).
13l Id at 999.
"38 See United States v Distler,671 F2d 954, 958 (6th Cir 1981) (one and one-half years

between grand jury proceedings and trial; not improper to admit forgotten grand jury testimony under 801(d)(1)(A)); United States v Whitaker, 619 F2d 1142, 1149 n 12 (5th Cir
1980). For state cases, see Annotation, Denial of Recollection as Inconsistent with Prior
Statement so as to Render Statement Admissible, 99 ALR3d 934 (1980 & Supp 1992).
139 See Bigham, 812 F2d at 946-47 ("selective memory loss [ ] more convenient than
actual"); DiCaro,772 F2d at 1322 (suspicion of feigned forgetfulness made witness's grand
jury testimony inconsistent); United States v Thompson, 708 F2d 1294, 1301-02 (8th Cir
1983) (no abuse of discretion in admission of prior testimony since forgetful witness "recalcitrant"); United States v Collins, 478 F2d 837, 838-39 (5th Cir 1973) (pre-federal rules;
unbelievable lack of memory permitted admission of prior trial testimony; admissible today
under FRE 804(b)(1)).
See also People v Green, 3 Cal 3d 981, 92 Cal Rptr 494, 479 P2d 998 (1971) (state
counterpart to Rule 801(d)(1)). The Green court characterized a memory lapse as an "implied denial" of prior testimony, and hence impliedly "inconsistent." Id at 1002. This concept of an "implied denial" is misleading though. If triers of fact draw any inference at all
from an assertion of memory loss, it is probably that the witness wishes to hide a matter
that he is inclined to affirm rather than deny. Accordingly, the denial of recollection is more
like an "implied affirmation" or "adoption" of the prior testimony. See Michael H. Graham,
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The reason for this interpretation of the inconsistency language is clear enough: judges have little patience with the turncoat
witness, and appellate courts wish to afford trial judges broad discretion to frustrate his efforts. But however understandable this
impatience is, substantive admission of the backup statements
does seem to compromise the values the hearsay rule advances.
The purpose of substantive evidence is to assist proof. Evidence
helps to prove only when it is reliable, and the requirement of inconsistency should be understood as a means of easing the concerns generally attending the admission of hearsay. Rule
801(d) (1) (A) does not insist upon inconsistency because it points
to untruthfulness; the inconsistency requirement serves a different
purpose. As the Advisory Committee observed, "the requirement
that the statement be inconsistent with the testimony given assures a thorough exploration of both versions while the witness is
on the stand ....-140 Thus the requirement of inconsistency appears in Rule 801(d)(1)(A) because it helps to insure that the conflict between current and former accounts will smoke out the falsehood inherent in at least one of them.
Lack of memory makes it impossible to achieve the "thorough
exploration" the drafters of the Federal Rules contemplated. Instead of trying to explain away the inconsistency presented by a
prior statement, the forgetful witness must let the statement
stand. If he remembers making the statement and forgets only its
basis, he can try to offer reasons why his recollection might not
have been accurate then. But the underlying fact the statement is
being offered to prove stands alone, facing no challenge from a
competing, non-hearsay account. The dialectic sought by the inconsistency requirement does not arise; the trier of fact is left with
only a single piece of hearsay to mull over, one that has only an
oath to give it any stamp of reliability.
The courts are undoubtedly correct that the turncoat witness
is a target of Rule 801(d) (1) (A). But the "inconsistency" language
of Rule 801(d) (1) (A) suggests that the drafters had in mind a particular type of turncoat: one who changes his story, rather than
falsely forgets it. Both turncoats obstruct the truthfinding process;

The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 Tex L Rev
151, 162 (1978). The "implied adoption" characterization however would be too powerful. It
would direct admission of all prior statements disingenuously forgotten regardless of the
conditions under which they were made, since adopted statements of any kind, sworn or
unsworn, pose "no hearsay problem." Notes of Advisory Committee, FRE 801(d)(1).
110 Notes of Advisory Committee, FRE 801(d)(1)(A).
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both are equally guilty of perjury. But the turncoat who only clams
up does less damage than the one who offers contradictory testimony, 4 1 and only the latter will offer the trier of fact an opportunity to "observe [the witness's] demeanor .. as he denies or tries
to explain away the inconsistency. ' 142 In light of this policy, the
judicial willingness to stretch the meaning of "inconsistency"
should be, if not puzzling, a bit unsettling nonetheless.
III.

IMPEACHMENT

Introduction of prior inconsistent statements, sworn or unsworn, has traditionally been held proper if used for the limited
purpose of impeachment. 143 Despite repeated doubt as to the effec-

141

Indeed, he may do no damage at all. See Graham, 56 Tex L Rev at 172-73 (cited in

note 139).
"' Notes of Advisory Committee, FRE 801(d)(1)(A), quoting the California Law Revision Commission's comment on a similar state provision. But see the House Judiciary Committee's Report on Rule 804(a)(3), which defines a witness as "unavailable" if he testifies to
a lack of memory. "Rule 804(a)(3) was approved in the form submitted by the Court. However, the Committee intends no change in existing federal law under which the court may
choose to disbelieve the declarant's testimony as to his lack of memory." HR Rep No 93650, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 7075, 7088 and following
Notes of Advisory Committee, FRE 804, citing United States v Insana, 423 F2d 1165, 116970 (2d Cir 1970). The placement of the House Committee's comment in 804(a)(3) is odd,
since the comment appears to operate as a gloss upon 801(d)(1)(A).
43 See Notes of Advisory Committee, FRE 801(d)(1)(A). The impeacher must lay a
foundation for the impeachment by asking the witness if he remembers making the statement and remembers it contradicting his present testimony. If he does recall, the impeachment is complete, and many courts hold that the impeachment need not and, indeed, cannot
be "proven up" with extrinsic evidence. See, for example, United States v Soundingsides,
820 F2d 1232, 1240-41 (10th Cir 1987); United States v Cline, 570 F2d 731, 735 (8th Cir
1978). See also Cleary, ed, McCormick on Evidence § 37 at 79 (cited in note 6). But some
courts admit even admittedly inconsistent statements, reasoning that parties should be allowed to highlight the inconsistency. See United States v Lashmett, 965 F2d 179, 182 (7th
Cir 1992); Williams v United States, 403 F2d 176, 179 (DC Cir 1968); United States v
Browne, 313 F2d 197, 199 (2d Cir 1963). See also Wigmore, 3A Evidence § 1037 at 1044-46
(1970) (cited in note 2).
If the witness denies making the statement, the impeachment is incomplete, and extrinsic evidence of the statement must be introduced to complete it. If the witness cannot recall
making the statement, the impeachment is also incomplete and must be proven up with
extrinsic evidence. This latter point is sensible and well-established, see id § 1037 at 104243, but apparently not so well known. The issue is still frequently litigated. See, for example, Walker v State, 581 S2d 570, 571 (Ala Crim App 1991); State v Stanfield, 562 S2d 969,
974 (La App 1990). And the Fifth Circuit seems to follow the opposite rule for no apparent
reason, other than what may be confusion as to what must be "inconsistent" to satisfy the
requirements of impeachment. See United States v Devine, 934 F2d 1325, 1344-45 (5th Cir
1991) (extrinsic evidence of inconsistent statement only admissible if witness denies having
made it; forgetting is not equivalent to denial); United States v Balliviero, 708 F2d 934,
939-40 (5th Cir 1983) (Since witness did not recall making statement inconsistent with trial
testimony, "there is clearly no rationale for the introduction of a prior 'inconsistent' state-
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tiveness of jury instructions limiting consideration of out-of-court
statements to the issue of credibility, courts have been confident of
their ability to regulate the impeachment process to prevent it
from becoming a subterfuge for placing otherwise inadmissible
hearsay before a jury. The chief regulation of impeachment that
courts have laid down has been the obvious one-that the impeaching material must be inconsistent with testimony. This rule
is nothing more than the familiar rule of relevance-that evidence
must be probative upon the issue on which it is offered. Statements that are not at least indirectly inconsistent do not make it
less likely the witness is telling the truth.
When a witness says he forgets, the basic rule holds that present lack of recollection is not inconsistent with past knowledge.4
As the Ninth Circuit stated in Kuhn v United States, "where the
witness gives no testimony injurious to the party calling him, but
only fails to render the assistance which was expected by professing to be without knowledge on the subject, there is no reason or
basis for impeachment .... ,,14' But, as is the case for Rule
801(d) (1) (A)'s statutory requirement of inconsistency, an exception
exists in the impeachment context when the witness's disavowal of
memory seems incredible. 146 Thus, an unbelievable assertion of
memory loss dilates the already broad definition of inconsistency.
Again, experience rather than logic offers the reason. "[T]he astute

ment."). For further criticism of this confusion, see Wigmore, 3A Evidence § 1037 at 104243 (cited in note 2).
144 "[W]here a witness merely states that he does not remember, he cannot be impeached by the showing of former statements with respect to the facts which he claims not
to remember ...." 98 CJS, Witnesses § 583 at 559 (West, 1957), quoted in Weinstein and
Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence § 607[06] at 607-102 n 38 (cited in note 6). See also New
Mexico Savings & Loan Ass'n v United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 454 F2d 328, 336
(10th Cir 1972); Taylor v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 344 F2d 281, 284 (2d Cir 1965);
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v Wray Equipment Corp., 286 F2d 491, 493 (1st Cir 1961).
Compare United States v Hankish, 502 F2d 71, 78 (4th Cir 1974) (trial judge has discretion
whether to allow use of prior statements during cross-examination of forgetful witnesses).
145 Kuhn v United States, 24 F2d 910, 913 (9th Cir 1928), rev'd in part and modified on
other grounds, 26 F2d 463 (9th Cir 1928). See also State v Cochran, 172 W Va 715, 310
SE2d 476, 478-79 (1983).
146 Rogers, 549 F2d at 496 ("claimed inability to recall, when disbelieved by the trial
judge, may be viewed as inconsistent"); Insana, 423 F2d at 1170. See also United States v
Shoupe, 548 F2d 636, 643 (6th Cir 1977) (impeachment of witness with memory "so selective as to be incredible" proper, but extensive use of prior statement violated defendant's
right to fair trial); Thompson, 708 F2d at 1299-1301 & n 2 ("claimed inability to recall
[inconsistent] when disbelieved"; but statements admitted substantively because witness effectively adopted them).
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unless his flank can be exposed to an
liar is sometimes impregnable
14 7
attack of this sort.' 1
Apart from inconsistency, impeachment by prior statement
has been subject to the test of collateralness, formulated succinctly
by Wigmore: "Could the fact, as to which the prior self-contradiction is predicated, have been shown in evidence for any purpose
independently of the self-contradiction?' 1 48 Contradiction cannot
be engaged in for its own sake; the contradiction must go to a material, non-collateral matter. This requirement survives even under
the codified Federal Rules as it is nothing more than a specific application of the relevance principle expressed in Rule 401: that evidence must be probative on a material issue to be admissible.' 4 9 To
say that a witness has made a false "collateral" assertion is simply
to say that a contradictory statement will be immaterial. The only
purpose for which impeaching hearsay is admissible is to demonstrate that the witness has lied about a non-collateral matter.
When the lie goes to a collateral matter, there is no reason for its
exposure.
To apply this principle rigorously to impeachment of a witness
who has not changed his story but has only forgotten it is difficult.
The witness has testified only to a lack of memory, but state of
memory is not a material issue. Courts have seemed to solve this
problem by adopting what has been called an "implied denial" theory. 50 Adopting the "implied denial" theory (on which the state
court in Green'5 1 relied to justify substantive admission of prior
statements) means positing that the witness's answer stands for
the precise opposite of the proposition asserted in the prior statement. This conception of impeachment should readily permit introduction of the entirety of a prior statement, since the whole
statement perfectly cancels the "denial" implicit in the witness's
assertion of memory loss. The fiction usefully disposes of concerns
about collateralness. For if a witness, by saying "I don't remember
X," is understood to say "Not X," the implied assertion "Not X"
hurts the impeaching party's case so long as X is a material, noncollateral issue.

" Wigmore, 3A Evidence § 1043 at 1061 (cited in note 2).
148 Id § 1020 at 1010 (distilling holding of Attorney General v Hitchcock, 1 Exch 91, 99
(1847)). See also Weinstein and Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence § 607[06] at 607-106 & n 54
(cited in note 6).

"' See FRE 401; FRE 402.

150 See Graham, 56 Tex L Rev at 172 n 102 (cited in note 139).
III See 479 P2d at 1002. See also note 139.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[60:167

The implied denial is, of course, a sleight of hand at best.
"Constructive denial" would be a better term. Nonetheless, it is a
necessary fiction. For to take the statement "I don't remember" for
what it is-a simple denial of recollection-destroys the entire basis for impeachment. Memory loss per se is never a material issue,
only the facts forgotten are.
But it may be easier to inaulge the fiction here than when the
impeaching statement is being used for substantive purposes under
Rule 801(d) (1) (A). The danger that the prior statembnt will not
face competition from a conflicting account at trial-the danger
the inconsistency requirement of Rule 801(d) (1) (A) seeks to
avert-is less when the statement is used for impeachment only.
Here at least the jury will be instructed not to consider the statement's substance at all. Accordingly, even if the jury does not imply a denial from the lack of recollection, it has at least been directed not to construe an affirmation of any matter from the
impeaching statement either. Though the fiction of inconsistency
remains, it is less troubling.
CONCLUSION

The forgetful witness offers a puzzle for evidentiary theory
and practice. Present in one sense, he is nonetheless absent in another, and the testimony he offers, while on its face neutral, has
the potential to derail a party's case where the party calling him
expects a more substantial account. The modern codified rules of
evidence do not ignore the forgetful witness. They permit parties
to refresh his recollection or to introduce prior cross-examined testimony and statements
against interest on the theory that he is
"unavailable. ' 152 Yet when the memory loss is incredible, the cases
hold that he is very available, available enough to be subject to
cross-examination and available enough to be impeached as if he
had given fuller testimony.
It may be hard to quibble with the results. Incredible forgetfulness is often a sign of witness tampering, and a system which
always takes such claims at face value runs the risk of being had.
But the countermeasures taken also pose risks. Admitting prior
grand jury testimony as "inconsistent" statements under the statutory rule exempting such statements from the definition of hearsay
ignores the meaning and purpose of the inconsistency language

They also permit introduction of recorded recollections, an important exception to
the hearsay rule not discussed here. See note 6.
1"2
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and results in the introduction of evidence that has many of the
traditional hearsay dangers. Permitting impeachment with even
less reliable hearsay places before the trier of fact evidence which
will almost certainly stand for more in the jury's collective mind
than the proposition that the witness is lying about his memory, a
result that goes beyond what pure considerations of relevance
would dictate. These risks may well be outweighed by the dangers
turncoat witnesses pose. If so, the expansive view of inconsistency
the cases espouse has common sense backing it up. But it is hard
to fit the holdings of the cases within the framework of the modern
law of evidence. To the student of evidence, the welcome courts
afford to the unconvincing forgetful witness's statement presents a
distinct exception to the hearsay rule, one not accounted for by
any of those codified in the Federal Rules.

